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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 17-3788 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ROBERT NELSON, 
 
   Appellant  
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 1-09-cr-00211-001) 
District Judge:  Hon. Christopher C. Conner 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 13, 2018 
 
Before:   JORDAN, VANASKIE, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: September 20, 2018) 
 
 _______________ 
 
OPINION∗ 
_______________ 
 
                                              
 ∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Robert Nelson appeals his revised 150-month term of imprisonment.  The District 
Court imposed it after granting Nelson’s motion to vacate his prior 235-month sentence, 
based on an intervening Supreme Court decision, Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 
2551 (2015).  Nelson argues that his revised sentence, which represents a 29-month 
upward variance from the recommended sentence under the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines (the “guidelines”), is unreasonable.  It is not, and we will affirm. 
I. Background 
 In 2010, Nelson pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).  At the same time, he also pled guilty to two drug-trafficking 
offenses, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846.  At sentencing, the District 
Court concluded that he had three or more qualifying prior violent felony or drug 
convictions under the Armed Career Criminal Act (the “ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), 
and therefore was subject to the ACCA’s enhanced penalties, including a 15-year 
mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment.  With that designation, Nelson was, by 
the Court’s calculation, subject to a guidelines imprisonment range of 188 to 235 months.  
After reviewing Nelson’s lengthy criminal history and the nature of his offense, the 
District Court concluded “that he must be subject to a very substantial term of 
imprisonment.”  (Appendix (“App.”) at 116.)  Specifically, the Court described Nelson as 
a man who had “squandered” numerous prior opportunities for rehabilitation and one 
who “poses a great risk of danger to the community and is extremely likely to 
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recidivate.”1  (App. at 116-17.)  Although noting that it “seriously considered an upward 
variance[,]” it concluded that “a sentence at the high end of the guideline range is 
appropriate[.]”  (App. at 117.)  Thus, it sentenced Nelson to a concurrent term of 235 
months’ imprisonment, to be followed by a 5-year term of supervised release, and it 
imposed a $2,300 fine.  We affirmed that sentence.  United States v. Nelson, 488 F. 
App’x 552 (3d Cir. 2012). 
A few years later, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Johnson, which 
invalidated part of the ACCA’s definition of violent felony.  135 S. Ct. at 2555-56, 2563 
(concluding that the “residual clause” of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is void for 
vagueness).  After Johnson, Nelson filed a motion to vacate his sentence, under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255, arguing that he lacked three qualifying predicate convictions and, therefore, his 
ACCA-enhanced sentence was unlawful.  The District Court agreed, granted his motion, 
and scheduled a resentencing hearing.2   
Prior to the hearing, the Probation Office circulated a memorandum with a revised 
calculation of Nelson’s recommended sentence under the guidelines.  Without the ACCA 
                                              
1 The District Court reviewed in detail Nelson’s criminal history, which, it noted, 
included eight prior convictions and multiple parole revocations.  It estimated that Nelson 
had spent “almost twenty years” in custody or intermediate punishment.  (App. at 116.)  
The Court considered it “remarkable that [Nelson] ha[d] amassed the record set forth in 
the presentence report given his custodial time,” saying that “when he was on the street 
Mr. Nelson was either engaged in or plotting criminal conduct.”  (App. at 116.) 
 
2 The District Court’s opinion sets forth the details of Nelson’s Johnson claim and 
its reasons for granting relief.  United States v. Nelson, No. 09-211, 2017 WL 4648145 
(M.D. Pa. Oct. 17, 2017).  We do not address it, however, as neither party appeals the 
District Court’s ruling. 
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designation, the calculated total offense level was 28 and the criminal history category 
was III, yielding a recommended sentence of 97 to 121 months’ imprisonment.   
At resentencing, the government argued for an above-guidelines sentence.  First, it 
filed a motion for an upward departure, arguing that the Court should raise Nelson’s 
criminal history category from III to VI, to more accurately reflect the seriousness of his 
prior crimes and his risk of recidivism.  Although the Court denied that motion and 
adopted the Probation Office’s guidelines calculation, it said it would account for the 
government’s reasoning when considering the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a).   
Nelson requested a sentence of time-served, or approximately eight and a half 
years, which was at the low end of the guidelines range.  The government, on the other 
hand, argued for an upward variance from the range, to a sentence of 235 months.  
According to the government, notwithstanding the change in case law, imposing the same 
sentence was still fair because Nelson’s personal history remained unchanged.    
After hearing from the parties, the District Court addressed each of the § 3553(a) 
sentencing factors.  It incorporated the lengthy observations it made in the first 
sentencing proceeding, reiterating its concerns about “the nature and circumstances of 
[Nelson’s] offense” and his history of reoffending.  (App. at 153.)  The Court said that, 
although it wanted to believe Nelson “ha[d] learned his lesson,” it found that suggestion 
“belied by his history[.]”  (App. at 154.)  In particular, the Court noted that it was “very 
concerned about the risk of recidivism,” and that it had in fact previously considered an 
upward variance from Nelson’s original ACCA-enhanced guideline range to adequately 
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account for that risk.  (App. at 155.)  Thus, it concluded, an upward variance was 
appropriate now.  It determined that a concurrent sentence of 150 months was 
“reasonable and appropriate, but not greater than necessary, to achieve [the] sentencing 
objectives.”  (App. at 155.)  It also reduced Nelson’s term of supervised release from 5 to 
4 years.3   
 Nelson has timely appealed.   
II.  Discussion4 
 Nelson does not claim procedural error.  Rather, he argues that his revised 150-
month sentence is substantively unreasonable because it represents a 29-month variance 
above the recommended guideline range.  According to Nelson, because the District 
Court previously “determined that a top-of-the-Guidelines range sentence” was 
appropriate, and because it did not identify any new aggravating factors when 
resentencing him, it abused its discretion by imposing a sentence that exceeded the 
revised guidelines’ range.  (Opening Br. at 14.)  We disagree. 
 We must affirm a procedurally sound sentence as substantively reasonable “unless 
no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular 
                                              
3 Specifically, the Court imposed a 150-month sentence and 4-year term of 
supervised release for each of Counts I (possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or 
more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)) and II (conspiracy to distribute 
same, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846), and a 120-month sentence and 3-year term of 
supervised release for Count III (felon-in-posession charge, under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)), to 
be served concurrently.   
 
4 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the substantive 
reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 
558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
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defendant for the reasons the district court provided.”  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 
558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  Indeed, “absent any significant procedural error, we 
must ‘give due deference to the district court’s determination that the § 3553(a) factors, 
on a whole,’ justify the sentence.”  Id. (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 
(2007)). 
 Here, the District Court addressed each of the § 3553(a) factors, and adequately 
explained its reasons for varying upward by 29 months.  Specifically, it highlighted its 
concerns about Nelson’s pattern of reoffending, notwithstanding having previously 
served multiple terms of imprisonment.  The record here was more than adequate to 
support those concerns and the sentence imposed.  We certainly cannot say that no 
reasonable court would have issued a 150-month sentence under the circumstances. 
III. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm Nelson’s sentence. 
